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A B S T R A C T   
Although liberalization of the cocoa sector has increased internal competition within the marketing chain it has 
also led to the emergence of informal market actors within the chain. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to 
analyse how the cocoa marketing chain operates by measuring and comparing the marketing margins of the 
formal and informal actors. Qualitative data were used to establish the structure of the marketing chain and 
quantitative data to estimate the marketing margins. A total sampling size of 76 cocoa market actors was ob-
tained by using a multi-stage sampling technique: 15 for qualitative data and 61 for quantitative data. 
Descriptive analysis was used to map the marketing chain and economic analysis to compute the costs and 
margins for both informal and formal market intermediaries from the Centre and South-West regions in 
Cameroon. The results indicated three market intermediaries (one informal and two formal) and four marketing 
channels by which cocoa moves from the farmers to the exporters. The calculation of marketing costs indicated 
that informal actors incurred the highest costs in both regions. The results regarding the marketing margins were 
twofold: informal actors obtain low net marketing margins when they do not use illicit strategies, but high net 
marketing margins when illicit strategies are used. Given the significant role of informal actors, we suggest that 
their actions should be integrated in a suitable manner into those of formal actors to contribute to a better 
performance of the marketing chain and to the sustainability of the cocoa sector.   
1. Introduction 
Marketing plays a critical role in meeting the goals of food security, 
poverty alleviation, and sustainable agriculture, particularly among 
smallholder farmers in developing countries (Makhura, 2001). As in 
many other agricultural markets, the cocoa market is characterized by a 
multitude of marketing agents (Ogunleye and Oladeji, 2007) who all 
play important roles within the marketing chain (Gilbert, 2008). Cocoa 
beans, produced and processed into the fermented, dried marketable 
form, are bought from the farmers by one or more successive traders, 
transported, and then sold to the final consumers that can be the local 
processors or the exporters1. Nevertheless, since the liberalization of the 
cocoa market in African countries, some smallholder actors in the 
marketing chain still find it difficult to participate fully (Makhura, 
2001). The price of cocoa as well as the margins of each actor in the 
marketing chain are determined by market forces (Kamdem et al., 
2013). In fact, numerous studies have shown that the smallholder re-
mains poorly linked to the agricultural market (Gabre-Madhin, 2009; 
Kamdem, 2016; Key et al., 2000) even though the liberalization of 
economies in developing countries was aimed at increasing the parti-
cipation of economic agents in market activities (Castaño, 2001; Malan 
et al., 2015; Masuka, 2013). 
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In Cameroon, before the liberalization of agricultural commodity 
chains, State agencies were established with a monopoly on the export 
trading of agricultural products. The ONCPB (Office National de 
Commercialisation des Produits de Base) was the main structure for the 
commercialization of cocoa with the role of a stabilization bank/fund; it 
provided direction for commercialization in zones where produce was 
bought and served as the only exporter. The ONCPB used to acquire 
produce through Licensed Buying Agents (LBAs) who it had mandated 
for the cocoa producing zones respecting the price and the quality level 
fixed by the Board. Cocoa producers were obliged to transport their 
produce to the collection centre of a divisional cooperative. From there, 
the product was handed over to LBAs mandated in each zone for each 
agricultural season (Inter-réseau, 2008). These agents which are re-
munerated by the Board, were also in charge of transporting the cocoa 
to the final destination (usually the port) where they were in charge of 
the conditioning of the produce for the subsequent export, and for ef-
fecting an insurance required by the regulations (Gbetnkom and Khan, 
2002). In addition, another state agency, the SODECAO (Société de 
Développement du Cacao), ensured direct support to the cocoa value 
chain (commercial functions upstream and downstream of the com-
modity chain, drying, storage, treatment, research & development, ex-
tension, and technical advice). The unions of cooperatives delivered 
many services such as the provision of inputs, allocation of loans, and 
social action for members, etc. These unions of cooperatives had the 
monopoly of buying the cocoa from the farmers and the producers’ 
price was guaranteed by a price stabilization system (Alary, 1996). 
Unfortunately, the problems and shortcomings of the regulated mar-
keting system (delays in payments by the Marketing Board to LBAs, 
delays in evacuation and marketing of the produce, and unavailability 
of agricultural inputs), as well as the specific need to conform to the 
principles of the structural adjustment programs2, led, in January 1991, 
to the liberalization of some functions the ONCPB previously held 
(Gbetnkom and Khan, 2002). 
In the aftermath of liberalization, the activities of most agents in the 
cocoa market were dictated by private exporters, who are registered as 
Licensed Agents at the Ministry of Trade (Kamdem et al., 2013, 
Gbetnkom and Khan, 2002). In this marketing system, two new orga-
nizations replaced the ONCPB: the ONCC (Office National du Cacao et du 
Café), a public establishment; and the CICC (Conseil Interprofessionnel du 
Cacao et le Café), which is the body of the sectoral organisation. The 
SODECAO withdrew progressively from its functions and transferred 
them to producers’ organisations. The responsibilities of the ONCC are 
to ensure compliance with the respective rules and regulations, super-
vise export quality control, represent the interests of the stakeholder 
groups, and provide information on prices on the international market. 
The ONCC does not intervene in the financing of marketing and cocoa 
production as its predecessor used to do. Since it does not carry out 
price stabilization, there are no more guarantees on the prices (Inter- 
réseau, 2008). The exporters can now buy cocoa from any market actor 
who is willing to sell. However, they buy mostly from LBAs, a bit less 
from cooperatives, occasionally directly from farmers, as well as from 
informal buying agents called “coaxers” to an unknown extent. Al-
though LBAs buy large amounts of their cocoa from coaxers, exporters 
prefer to buy from LBAs because LBAs are those who usually carry out 
the standardization, grading and packaging that are crucial for cocoa 
quality. In addition, exporters would incur high transaction costs when 
buying small quantities, so LBAs carry out the tedious work of col-
lecting small amounts and selling large quantities within a short period. 
Local processors also buy cocoa only from exporters and LBAs and not 
from coaxers and farmers because of the need to grade and standardize 
the produce (Adubi and Okunmadewa, 1999). 
Although the shift towards liberalized markets aimed at increasing 
efficiency and competition within the Cameroon cocoa sector in gen-
eral, and in the marketing chain in particular, it has been claimed that, 
in some cases, the abolition of Marketing Boards slowed down the 
performance of the supply chain regarding the quality of the output and 
the share of margins among market actors within the chain (Gilbert, 
2008). The Cameroonian law N°95/11 of 27 July 1995 states that every 
intermediary agent in the cocoa marketing chain must sign a statement 
of existence. Nevertheless, it is widely observed, that apart from the 
formal market intermediary agents—LBAs and Cooperatives— there are 
informal buying agents3 (coaxers), small travelling traders who operate 
mostly with the farmers and deal directly with them. They trade in 
small volumes at a time, use limited amounts of money, and utilize 
simple means of transport, such as bicycles, motor bikes and cars 
(Lenou, 2017). They principally buy from farmers who are dispersed in 
rural areas that are difficult to access and are poorly organized. The low 
level of organisation allows them to buy cocoa at low prices. The most 
significant factor is that coaxers perform pre-financing and, in addition, 
pay at the moment of purchase which is usually not the case for LBAs, 
cooperatives nor exporters. Coaxers lend money to producers at the 
beginning of the agricultural season, obliging farmers to sell their 
harvests to them. According to Bagal et al., (2013) and Inter-réseau 
(2008), this flexibility offered to producers explains the prevalence of 
coaxers in the marketing system despite the fact that they often mis-
inform the producers on the quantity and quality of their cocoa. Some 
estimations state that about 70% of the cocoa beans exported are 
bought by coaxers at the farm gate (Inter-réseau, 2008). 
Owing to the important changes that took place in the aftermath of 
market liberalisation, an in-depth study of the prevailing market lin-
kages is essential. However, meaningful understanding of the sector is 
still incomplete. Thus, in this paper, we investigate the presence and 
importance of formal and informal market intermediaries within the 
cocoa marketing chain in Cameroon. The study on coaxers is of parti-
cular importance because they execute significant economic and social 
functions. Therefore, the aim is to analyse the marketing chain by 
measuring and comparing the costs and margins of the two types of 
market intermediaries (formal versus informal). The paper proceeds 
with Section 2, which presents a literature review on the linkages be-
tween formal and informal actors. Section 3 portrays the study areas, 
the data used, and the methods of analysis. The results are outlined in  
Section 4. Section 5 discusses the main findings of this research, fo-
cusing on market linkages between formal and informal actors as well 
as on how costs and marketing margins are shared among them. The 
conclusions are featured presented in Section 6. 
2. Formal and informal linkages and the development of 
economic activities 
According to Hart (1973), an informal economy is mostly prevalent 
where official arrangements are not capable of providing essential 
functions. This happens either because the regulations are inadequate 
or because of weak enforcement resulting in evasive behaviour (Brown 
and McGranahan, 2016; Sinha and Kanbur, 2012; Williams and Nadin, 
2010). Illicit action in market exchange arises when pecuniary trans-
actions are hidden. Such economic activities involving illicit goods and 
services are not considered as informal but instead as part of the se-
parate criminal economy (Smith and McElwee, 2013; Williams, 2016). 
Literature on the concept of informality in Africa on the one hand as-
serts that the informal sector in developing countries would disappear 
once sufficient levels of economic growth were achieved (Sallah, 2016). 
2 The liberalization of economies in the 1990s through the Structural 
Adjustment Programs in developing countries aimed at increasing the pro-
ductivity and competitiveness of economic agents, and thereby their countries. 
3 According to law N°95/11 of 27 July 1995 on the organization and the 
commercialization of cocoa, every intermediary acting in the cocoa market is 
called to sign a statement of existence and should have a trader’s card issued by 
the Cocoa and Coffee Inter-professional Council (CICC). 
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On the other hand, the literature also points out that economic devel-
opment could take a different perspective when the expansion of in-
formal economic activities (North, 1990) is taken into account. 
Literature on informality provides evidence on various views of 
formal-informal linkages and economic development (Portes et al., 
1989). The first, the regulation-based view, which comprises dualist and 
legalist theoretical interpretations, sees the emergence of an informal 
economy as a consequence of barriers to formality and a legal status. 
For dualists (Hart, 1973; ILO, 2002) in a formal economy, a sector may 
have persisted for some time but undergoes profound changes which 
causes a brief excess supply of labour (Lewis, 1954). This excess labour 
force acts in the economic space between the established formal system 
and complete unemployment (Brown and McGranahan, 2016). The 
informal sector is concentrated on activities of subsistence. The in-
formal entrepreneurs are excluded from the formal economy and from 
participating in associations (Dimova and Nordman, 2014; ILO, 2002). 
Following the arguments of the legalist (Alina, 1994; Sauvy, 1984), the 
informal sector helps to avoid the negative effects of excessive regula-
tion (Chen, 2012). In that sense, the informal economy is an answer to 
the excessive official regulation of markets (Brown and McGranahan, 
2016). Entrepreneurs engage in an informal economy because they 
profit from a higher degree of autonomy, flexibility, and freedom as 
compared to the formal sector (Gerxhani, 2004). 
The second viewpoint, the structuralist school, does not separate the 
economy into informal and formal, but sees the informal economy as a 
by-product of the formal economy (Sallah, 2016). For the structuralist 
school the informal economy is growing rather than decreasing because, 
following this argument, the informal and formal economy are in-
herently linked rather than separate (Castells and Portes, 1989; Moser, 
1978). The expansion of the informal sector is an attempt by capitalists, 
in connivance with the State, to reduce input and labour costs by 
adopting informal work arrangements with private contractors, and 
thereby increasing their competitiveness (Brown and McGranahan, 
2016; Chen, 2012). This standpoint highlights the linkages between 
informal and formal economic activities, as the former are, in practice, 
completely dependent on the latter without enjoying any of the ad-
vantages of formal regulation (Anyidoho and Steel, 2016). 
The third and final view, a more integrated perspective, sees the in-
formal economy as a complement to the formal economy (Sallah, 
2016). The formal and informal economies are represented as com-
plementary to an extent as they grow or decline simultaneously; one 
does not fall when the other expands (Williams, 2004; Williams and 
Windebank, 2002). In this sense, the informal economy possesses large 
positive attributes and influences economic development (North, 
1990). Wealthy economic agents are the main beneficiaries in formal 
economic activities as they are also seen as the principal recipients of 
the benefits of informal activities. They benefit more from unpaid 
community exchanges, paid informal work, and rewarding forms of 
informal work than economic agents excluded from the formal 
economy (Nelson and Smith, 2009; Sallah, 2016; Slack and Jensen, 
2009; Williams, 2004). As a consequence, economic development is 
thus portrayed, not merely as a process of formalization but also in 
terms of the capabilities of economic agents to engage in both the 
formal and informal economy (Williams, 2004). 
In the cocoa marketing chain, the informal intermediaries (coaxers) 
exist alongside the formal intermediaries (LBAs and cooperatives) ei-
ther on their own initiative or as employed by the formal intermediaries 
to buy cocoa from the producers at the lowest price. In fact, amongst all 
the market intermediaries, the coaxers are the ones that are closest to 
(smallholder) farmers; as a result, their emergence since the liberal-
ization of the cocoa market seems to be explained theoretically more by 
the legalist and structuralist representations than by the dualist and in-
tegrated representations. It is therefore important to get better insights 
into how costs and values are shared among the market intermediaries 
in order to clearly portray informal-formal linkages in the marketing 
chain, and thereby propose some policy options that align better with 
reality. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Study areas 
The study was carried out in Centre and South-West regions of 
Cameroon, precisely in four Divisions, Ayos and Ngomedzap in the 
Centre as well as Muyuka and Konye in the South-West. These Divisions 
were selected mainly due to their location within the ProCISA4 inter-
vention zones, a project promoting sustainable value chains. In addi-
tion, these localities belong to the three regions with the highest cocoa 
production in Cameroon. The Centre region is the main production area 
with around 90,000 tons/year, while the South-West is in the third 
place contributing 46,000 tons, just below the South region with 48,000 
tons/year (NCCB, 2014; Mukete et al., 2018). Fig. 1 displays the study 
area. 
3.2. Methods of data collection 
The data for this article were collected during the 2016–2017 cocoa 
season. A multi-stage sampling technique was used to select the re-
spondents, which means that, at the first step, four Divisions were 
purposively selected: Ayos and Ngomedzap (Center region), and 
Muyuka and Konye (South West region). This first selection was based 
on ProCISA project intervention zones. As a second step, six villages in 
Ayos, five in Ngomedzap, six in Muyuka, and five in Konye were de-
liberately selected, based on the presence of cooperatives and/or cocoa 
buyers in these villages. Thirdly, at the village level, cooperatives and 
buyers (coaxers and LBAs) were randomly selected and interviewed. 
Data were obtained in two steps. In the first step, qualitative data 
were collected face to face with actors from the cocoa market (Board 
Members of cocoa farmers’ cooperatives and cocoa buyers). The main 
objective was to scrutinise how the cocoa market in Cameroon is 
structured. Therefore, 15 market actors were retained. That is five ex-
ecutive members of cooperatives, five coaxers, and five LBAs. In the 
second step, we collected quantitative data on costs and the margins of 
cocoa marketing as segregated by the groups of actors. These data from 
primary sources were obtained through structured pre-tested ques-
tionnaires administered to the market intermediaries (coaxers, LBAs, 
and cooperatives). The questionnaires were designed for each category 
of market intermediary. Thus, 61 cocoa market actors were randomly 
chosen and a semi-structured questionnaire was administered to 10 
cooperatives, 24 coaxers, and 27 LBAs. As a result, a total sample size of 
76 cocoa market actors was obtained. It is worth noting that the 
questionnaire of cocoa growers’ cooperatives was administered to ex-
ecutive members in the cooperative. The distribution of the respondents 
for the study areas is revealed in Table 1. 
3.3. Data Analysis 
Data entry, coding, and cleaning were executed in Microsoft Excel 
2013. Data were then exported to the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) version 20 for descriptive and economic analyses. The 
descriptive analysis consisted of mapping the cocoa marketing chain. 
This exercise was performed in qualitative terms whereby a graphic 
presentation gives a clear understanding of the sequence of activities, 
the key actors, and their relationships within the marketing chain (Tola 
and Ketema, 2014). 
For the economic analyses, the marketing costs and margins for 
4 ProCISA stands for the project "Promotion of Green Innovation Centres for 
the Agricultural and Food Sector" which was funded by the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internatinale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and implemented in col-
laboration with the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA). 
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each market intermediary were calculated. The gross margin for market 
intermediaries is the difference between their selling price and the 
buying price of one kg of cocoa. The net margin is obtained after de-
ducting the total marketing costs from the gross margin. Since co-
operatives are specific market intermediaries that do not buy cocoa, 
their gross marketing margin is computed in a rather different way. In 
this case, the gross margin refers to the average amount of money de-
duced by the cooperatives per kg of cocoa collected from their farmers. 
For coaxers and LBAs, the Gross Marketing Margin (GMM) and the Net 
Marketing Margin (NMM) were estimated using the following formulas 
(Hussainet al., 2013). 
=GMM Ps Pb. (1) 
GMM represents the gross marketing margin, Ps the selling price, and 
Pb the buying price. 
=NMM GMM TMC. (2) 
NMM represents the net marketing margin, GMM the gross marketing 
margin, and TMC the total marketing costs. 
4. Results 
This section, first, displays the results from the mapping of the cocoa 
marketing chain in Cameroon. Afterwards, it illustrates the findings 
regarding the costs and margins of market intermediaries by elabor-
ating on two possible alternatives: 1) when informal actors do not use 
illicit strategies and 2) when informal actors are using illicit strategies. 
4.1. Structure of the cocoa marketing chain 
Fig. 2 reveals the map of the cocoa marketing chain in Cameroon 
which describes the activities as well as the actors and their linkages 
within the market chain. 
The structure of the marketing chain at the national level evidenced 
the cocoa sector to be a competitive market in which many different 
markets actors exchange the produce as observed in Fig. 2. Although 
there are no data yet available to indicate the magnitude of the diverse 
cocoa marketing channels in Cameroon, based on the different relations 
that exist among the market actors it could be noted that four variant 
marketing channels exist for cocoa beans: Marketing channel 1: 
Farmers – Coaxer – LBAs – Exporters; Marketing channel 2: Farmers – 
LBAs – Exporters; Marketing channel 3: Farmers – Cooperatives – 
LBAs – Exporters; and Marketing channel 4: Farmers – Cooperatives – 
Exporters. It can be noted that although only the first marketing 
channel contains the informal market intermediaries (coaxers), it the 
Fig. 1. The study area.  
Table 1 
Geographical distribution of respondents for qualitative and quantitative data.          
Regions Localities Respondents 
Coaxers LBAs Cooperatives 
Qltativea Qtativeb Qltative Qtative Qltative Qtative  
Center Ayos 02 07 02 08 02 03 
Ngomedzap 00 07 01 08 01 02 
South- West Muyuka 01 07 01 08 01 04 
Konye 01 03 01 03 01 01 
Total 05 24 05 27 05 10 
NB: (a) refers to qualitative and (b) to quantitative.  
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most common. The others consist only of formal market intermediaries 
(LBAs and cooperatives). In each step of the marketing channel, a 
market intermediary will process and refine cocoa to a homogenous 
quality before delivering it to another buyer or to the end point that is 
the sea port from where cocoa is exported. 
Marketing channel 1 is the most common channel in cocoa buying 
areas, especially in the Centre region. In this channel, coaxers approach 
farmers to buy their cocoa. The coaxers travel from village to village 
looking for cocoa producers who are ready to sell. It is important to 
note that farmers sometimes opt to sell cocoa that is not sufficiently 
dried, i.e. according to the required standard (humidity content of 
maximum 8%). Although transactions of this kind are illegal since they 
are prohibited by the law, they exist because each of the two market 
actors benefit from them. On the one hand, farmers are able to sell wet 
cocoa beans when they are particularly in need of immediate cash, even 
if they know that they will receive a price lower than the market price 
from the coaxers. On the other hand, the coaxers benefit from buying 
cocoa beans that are still humid because this reduces the time they 
spend on their journey and it equally reduces the fuel costs incurred 
travelling from village to village. The coaxers further make a profit from 
the farmers, who are not aware of appropriate deductions for an ele-
vated humidity content, by effectuating increased deductions for hu-
midity in cocoa beans. 
Another form of relationship between farmers and informal buyers 
(coaxers) is the provision of credit. The type of credit offered depends 
on the period of provision. During the production periods, credit is 
offered to farmers in the form of advance payments. Additionally 
during periods where the management of the plantations is required, 
credit is offered mostly in the form of agricultural inputs to enable 
farmers to invest in their farms. However, farmers can ask for credit in 
cash at any time to resolve an urgent family issue (illness, payment of 
children’s school fees, etc). The credit is meant to be paid back during 
the harvest period by selling their produce to the coaxers who offered 
the service. The buyers (more often coaxers than LBAs) use this practice 
intensively to attract farmers to sell to them. 
Among the market intermediaries, the relationship between coaxers 
and LBAs is based on the informal contract they conclude. In such 
contracts, the coaxers take the initiative to deliver a given quantity of 
cocoa to the LBA in a defined period. Sometimes, the LBA grant credits 
to the coaxers to proceed with the purchases. 
In marketing channel 2, farmers with large quantities of cocoa sell 
directly to the LBAs. These farmers can sometimes benefit from other 
services, such as transportation, apart from the offers of credit pre-
viously described. LBAs hire out their vehicles to farmers to enable 
them to transport cocoa from their farms to the warehouse at a cheap 
rate. This is indeed another way of attracting farmers to sell primarily to 
them. In general, even big farmers do not have adequate personal 
means of transportation for evacuating their cocoa from the farm to the 
market. 
In marketing channel 3, farmers sell their cocoa via their co-
operative. The cooperatives receive and assemble cocoa beans from the 
farmers and organize markets where LBAs come to bargain and buy. 
The price mechanism used by the cooperatives, the minimum selling 
price, is set before the market day in agreement with the members. In 
general, this minimum price already set can only increase since the 
cooperative is in a monopolistic situation during market days. The co-
operative, in that specific area, is the unique seller in front of many 
buyers. As the bargaining power of the cooperative is high, farmers 
receive better selling prices than the price received when selling in-
dividually. 
However, because of a lack of adequate means of transportation for 
collecting and gathering cocoa from their members, some cooperatives 
(e.g., Ngomedzap) hire vehicles from LBAs to transport their produce; 
as a result in return, they are sometimes obliged to sell their produce to 
the buyers from whom they hired the vehicle. By doing this, co-
operatives sometimes lose the opportunity of selling at better prices 
when they are obliged to accept the price offered by the buyer who has 
offered the vehicle rental service. Another form of relationship, though 
not common, in this marketing channel is sales contracts between the 
cooperatives and the LBAs for delivering a given quantity of cocoa at a 
particular period and at a price that is stated in the contract. In such 
contracts, the price received by the farmers is generally higher than the 
price in normal markets. 
In marketing channel 4, the cooperatives sell the cocoa directly to 
exporters. Although this channel exists, it has not really common since 
cooperatives, mostly those without adequate means of transportation, 
face difficulties in getting exporters who are ready to come and buy 
cocoa on the spot. Another reason is that cooperatives do not always 
have sufficient volumes of cocoa to offer to the exporters who prefer 
large quantities. Indeed, the relationship between farmers and co-
operatives relies on trust. Farmers have confidence in their cooperatives 
that this guarantee their interests and in turn, they must sell their 
produce only through their cooperatives. However, this is not always 
the case since some members sometimes decide to sell to other buyers, 
mainly to coaxers, because of delays in the process of selling, evacuating 
and particularly of receiving the payments. 
The description of the cocoa marketing chain illustrates the sig-
nificance of the different market strategies used by the market actors. 
Four main strategies were identified within the marketing chain. 
4.2. Marketing cost estimation for market intermediaries 
Results in the previous section indicate that there are three market 
intermediaries, two formal (LBAs and Cooperatives) and one informal 
(coaxers), that enable cocoa to be moved from the farmer to the ex-
porter. Estimation of the marketing costs incurred by these inter-
mediaries depends on the activities they carry out. For intermediaries 
that buy and sell cocoa in the country (coaxers and LBAs), the main 
Fig. 2. Structure of the cocoa marketing chain in Cameroon.  
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expenses comprise transportation costs for buying or collecting, the 
storage cost (for those who have a warehouse), the payment of taxes, 
costs of labour, personal expenditures, transportation costs for selling to 
the final buyer and other expenses. For cooperatives, the intermediary 
which carries out only the activity of selling, the expenses only take into 
account the costs of evacuating the cocoa from the farmer's fields and 
storage in the cooperatives’ warehouses while awaiting the market day. 
The data that we collected from the field, indicate that, on average, the 
costs are not the same for each market intermediary and they also vary 
by locality, as can be seen in Table 2. 
Table 2 displays the total costs per delivery and per kg. A delivery 
refers to a given quantity of cocoa assembled and sold by an inter-
mediary during a given period of time (usually daily or every three 
days, depending on the intermediary and/or the availability of cocoa on 
the market). 
The results indicate generally thatirrespective of the market inter-
mediary, marketing costs are almost twice as high in the Centre region 
than in the South-West (except labour for cooperatives). The trend is 
the same even when the marketing costs of coaxers are considered 
where in the South-West region they support costs of storage (1,888.8 
XAF) and transportation (3,333 XAF) while in the Centre region they do 
not. This latter difference can be explained by the fact that coaxers in 
the Centre region are in more of a partnership with their buyers (LBAs). 
These buyers cover some of their expenses, particularly the costs of 
storage and transportation. 
The second major result shows that, irrespective of the region, in-
formal market intermediaries support higher marketing costs than 
formal intermediaries. Coaxers have the highest marketing costs/kg in 
both regions (120 XAF and 65 XAF), followed by LBAs (65 XAF and 32 
XAF) and lastly, by cooperatives (16 XAF and 9 XAF) for the Center and 
South-West regions. A major reason for this difference is that the 
market intermediaries do not incur the same categories of costs. Similar 
findings were pointed out by Murthy et al.,(2007) on the banana 
marketing chain where cooperatives were found to be the market in-
termediary with the least marketing costs compared to the costs of 
wholesalers and retailers. One reason put forward by the author is that 
cooperatives procure directly from farmers and sell directly to con-
sumers. By doing this, they eliminate market intermediaries and sub-
stantially reduce marketing costs. Indeed, retailers in the banana mar-
keting chain can be seen, to some extent, as similar to coaxers in the 
cocoa marketing chain. Another explanation may be linked to the fact 
that coaxers manipulate smaller quantities and, as a result, they do not 
benefit from the economies of scale like LBAs and cooperatives that deal 
with larger quantities. Additionally, the accessibility cost are high as 
coaxers operate in isolated areas with roads that are only accessible by 
foot or motorbikes. 
Finally, when the shares of the various costs in the total marketing 
costs are considered, it was observed that, in both regions, the most 
important costs appear to be taxes and transportation costs for coaxers 
and LBAs, and labour for Cooperatives. These results are similar to that 
of Kiran et al.,(2014) on the tea marketing chain. In their study, 
transportation costs, for most market intermediaries, represent at least 
20% of the total marketing cost. Transportation was also revealed by  
Kiran et al.,(2014) to have the highest marketing costs for wholesalers 
and retailers in the rice market, as they represented about 56% of the 
total marketing cost for these intermediaries. 
4.3. Estimation of market intermediaries’ marketing margins 
Table 3 shows the marketing margins of the intermediaries (coaxers, 
LBAs, and cooperatives). Average buying and selling prices were used 
to estimate the marketing margins of the intermediaries and were cal-
culated from the data collected in the field. 
Results from Table 3 indicate that the net marketing margin (NMM) 
for cocoa market intermediaries differs in both regions. Apart from 
cooperatives where the NMM is higher in the Centre region than in the 
South-West; market intermediaries have a higher NMM in the South- 
West region than those in the Centre. In the South-West, the NMM is 
equal to –15 XAF/kg for coaxers, 93 XAF/kg for LBAs, and 2 XAF/kg for 
cooperatives, while in the Centre region it is –77 XAF/kg, 57 XAF/kg, 
and 51.78 XAF/kg respectively. Coaxers have a negative NMM in both 
regions due to the high marketing costs that the informal market actors 
support in the marketing chain. These results are contrary to that of the 
study carried out by Iyabano et al. (2012) in the South and South-West 
regions of Cameroon. The findings of this study revealed that coaxers 
had, on average, an NMM of 104.44 XAF/kg. Moreover, according to 
our results, LBAs realize profits within the cocoa marketing chain as 
they have an NMM of 57 XAF/Kg in the Centre region and 95 XAF/kg in 
the South-West. These findings are in line with those of Iyabano et al. 
(2012) which revealed that LBAs, on average, had a positive margin of 
140.58 XAF/kg. 
As coaxers have been found to have the highest marketing costs, 
they have also been found to have a negative NMM. However, from the 
field, there are some illegal strategies such as “rigged scales” and “false 
humidity content level” actually used by coaxers to avoid the negative 
NMM that they would face otherwise. 
4.4. “Rigged scales” and “Humidity content level”: Two illegal strategies 
used by the informal market intermediaries for avoiding a negative NMM 
According to the homo economicus, the fact that coaxers incur ne-
gative marketing margins and still perform well in the cocoa marketing 
chain seems to be a paradox. Actually, to avoid negative marketing 
margins, they may use one or both of two “illegal” strategies. These 
Table 2 
Major marketing costs of cocoa market intermediaries (in XAF per delivery and 
per kg) in the Centre and South-West regions.         
Costs per 
delivery 
Centre Region South-West Region 
Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Coaxers LBAs Coop. Coaxers LBAs Coop.  
Average quantity 1,268 14,712 5,965 2,950 19,182 17,033 
Transport for 
buying 
39,471 126,015 9,500 17,100 104,959 19,165 
Storage cost 0 19,951 14,600 1,888 18,343 29,805 
Labour 12,046 157,706 76,916 7,170 71,577 73,710 
Taxes 85,642 236,500 0 150,000 198,000 0 
Personal 
expenses 
13,321 20,843 0 12,950 30,272 0 
Transport for 
selling 
0 207,525 0 3,333 195,000 0 
Other cost 
(bribes) 
1,785 197,500 0 0 7,636 31,822 
Total cost/ 
delivery 
152,266 966,041 101,016 192,441 625,788 154,502 
Total cost/kg 120 65 16 65 32 9 
Table 3 
Gross and net marketing margins of coaxers and LBAs (in XAF per delivery and 
per kg).         
Items Centre region South-West region 
Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Coaxers LBAs Coop. Coaxers LBAs Coop.  
Average buying price 1,042 1,064 – 1,040 1,047 – 
Average selling price 1,085 1,186 1,111 1,090 1,172 1,095 
Gross marketing margin 43 122 67.78 50 125 11 
Marketing cost 120 65 16 65 32 9 
Net marketing margin –77 57 52 –15 93 2 
L. Lenou Nkouedjo, et al.   Geoforum 117 (2020) 61–70
66
strategies are operationalized in transactions in two stages. In the first, 
the transactions are between coaxers and farmers, and coaxers come out 
with some “illegal” gains. In general, when they buy cocoa from 
farmers, coaxers use either the “rigged scale” strategy, “humidity con-
tent (HC) level” strategy, or even a combination of both strategies to 
deceive the vigilance of farmers. As far as “rigged scales” are concerned, 
some farmers are becoming more and more vigilant by insiting on the 
use of their own weighing scales; in many cases unfortunately, coaxers 
continue to give wrong weights to farmers. Concerning the HC level, the 
strategy is mainly based in reporting a higher level than the actual level 
in the cocoa beans. The recommended HC level in cocoa beans suitable 
for market is a maximum of 8%. This level is normally checked by a 
humidity testing machine but coaxers buy cocoa from farmers without 
this testing machine in order to estimate the quality of cocoa beans as 
poor. With data from the field, the implication of these “illegal” stra-
tegies can be illustrated in Tables 4 and 5 as follows. 
Table 4 shows for example that, for 100 kg of cocoa really owned by 
the farmers, the coaxers make a reduction of 5 kg, on average, during 
the weighing process since their scales are rigged. Moreover, they also 
reduce, on average, 20 kg of cocoa from the real weight supposedly 
because the cocoa is not dried to the recommended HC level of 8%. The 
final quantity that the coaxers pay for becomes 75 kg instead of 100 kg. 
This indicates that the real price/kg at which the coaxers are buying 
cocoa is 781.5 XAF/kg instead of 1042 XAF/kg in the Centre region and 
780 XAF/kg instead of 1040 XAF/kg in the South-West region. There-
fore, taking advantage of the asymmetry of information, coaxers in-
crease substantially their profit to the detriment of smallholders. For 
example, coaxers can gain dishonestly up to 260 XAF/kg of cocoa from 
the farmers. 
In the second stage, the coaxers sell cocoa to the LBAs and there is 
no more asymmetric information. Both actors have a perfect knowledge 
on the quality of scales and HC level in the cocoa beans. As in the first 
stage, the same procedure is carried out, but with the slight difference 
that now the transactions are more transparent. Rigged scales can no 
longer be used and the HC level is adequately evaluated. In general, the 
HC levels measured in the second stage are far lower than those ex-
pressed by coaxers in the first stage since they use it to mislead farmers.  
Table 5 completes the analyses of Table 4 and points out that coaxers 
face a reduction only if cocoa beans are wet. After control of the quality 
and of the HC level on 100 kg of cocoa in gross weight, the LBAs finally 
reduce only 10 kg of cocoa, on average, due to high HC level. Conse-
quently, the coaxers finally sell at a net weight of 90 kg, on average. In 
fact, the results indicate that the real price at which the coaxers are 
really selling cocoa is 976.5 XAF/kg instead of 1085 XAF/kg in the 
Centre region and 981XAF/kg instead of 1090 XAF/kg in the South- 
West region. 
Considering the transparency of information between coaxers and 
LBAs in the second stage, coaxers lose some benefits from the poor 
quality of the cocoa they are selling. They can lose up to 109 XAF/kg. 
Considering the average price at which coaxers buy cocoa in the first 
stage and the average price at which they sell it in the second stage, 
suggests that coaxers can only make profit if they pay lower prices at 
farm gate level, receive higher prices from LBAs or use illicit strategies. 
Illegal strategies enable coaxers on average to make a gross margin of 
976.5–781.5 = 195 XAF/kg in the Centre region and of 
981–780 = 201 XAF/kg in the South-West (Table 6). 
Considering the marketing costs of 120 XAF/kg in the Centre region 
and of 65 XAF/kg in the South-West determined in Table 1, the NMM/ 
kg from the transactions resulting from “illegal” strategies is then 
195–120 = 75 XAF in the Centre region and 201–65 =136 XAF/kg in 
the South-West, on average (see Table 6). It is these “illegal” strategies 
that enable the coaxers in the both regions to obtain a positive NMM. 
Comparatively, transactions with illegal strategies enable coaxers to 
obtain gains of 75–(–77) = 152 XAF/kg in the Centre region and 
136–(–15) = 147 XAF/kg in the South-West more than the gains is-
suing from the transactions without illegal strategies. Indeed, when 
considering the NMM of LBAs and cooperatives computed in Table 3 
together with the NMM of coaxers from illegal transactions (see  
Table 6), the coaxers appear now as those with high gains: the average 
NMM is equal to 75 XAF/kg for coaxers, 57 XAF/kg for LBAs, and 52 
Table 4 
Implementation of illegal strategies for 100 kg of cocoa buying by coaxers from farmers (Centre and South-West regions).        
Variables  Centre region South-West region 
Quantities (kg) Unit Price (CFA) Amount Unit Price (CFA) Amount  
Gross weight of farmer’s cocoa 100 1,042 104,200 1040 104,000 
Reduction due to riggedscale by coaxers 5 1,042 5,210 1040 5,200 
Reduction due to HC by coaxers 20 1,042 20,840 1040 20,800 
Net quantity paid for by coaxers 75 1,042 78,150 1040 78,000 
Real unit price 781.5 780 
Table 5 
Implementation of illegal strategies for 100 kg of cocoa selling by coaxers to LBA (Centre and South-West regions).         
Variables Centre region South-West region 
Quantities (kg) Unit Price (CFA) Amount Quantities (kg) Unit Price (CFA) Amount  
Gross weight of coaxer’s cocoa 100 1,085 108,500 100 1,090 109,000 
Reduction due to rigged scale by coaxers 0 1,085 0 0 1,090 0 
Reduction by LBAs 10 1,085 10,850 10 1,090 10,900 
Net quantity paid for by LBAs 90 1,085 97,650 90 1,090 98,100 
Real unit price for cocoa sold by coaxers 976.5 981 
Table 6 
Comparison of coaxers’ market margins with and without illegal strategies in 
the Centre and South-West regions.       











Buying price 1,042 781 1,040 780 
Selling price 1,085 976 1,090 981 
Gross margin 43 195 50 201 
Marketing cost 120 120 65 65 
Net margin –77 75 –15 136 
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XAF/kg for cooperatives in the Centre and around 136 XAF/kg, 93 
XAF/kg, and 2 XAF/kg, respectively, in the South-West. 
5. Discussion 
Our results indicate that the informality within the cocoa marketing 
chain in Cameroon can be explained by a lack of adequate regulation of 
the market, specifically when coaxers deal with producers (Brown and 
McGranahan, 2016; Chen, 2012). Indeed, putting aside the fact that 
coaxers misinform cocoa farmers, the gains obtained by both actors in 
such transactions explain largely the decision to opt for informality. In 
such interactions, farmers find more independence, flexibility, and 
autonomy as compared to dealing with formal market intermediaries 
(LBAs and cooperatives); coaxers reduce the costs, time, and pains that 
would arise from following the rules. According to Sallah (2016), the 
informality within the marketing chain can also be seen as a by-product 
of the liberalization of the cocoa market since the provision of the 
majority of support services to production and commercialization has 
stopped. This has led formal as well as informal agents to provide 
farmers with certain support services (Inter-réseau, 2008). For example, 
coaxers provide farmers with credits but, in return, the farmers are 
obliged to sell their cocoa to them first of all at low prices. 
The way informal arrangements are built up between formal and 
informal market intermediaries, explains, to a large extent, why mar-
keting costs are higher for informal market actors and why they adopt, 
some subterfuges to gain some profits. The more cocoa farmers produce 
at a small-scale and are dispersed over large areas that are difficult to 
reach, the higher the marketing costs for the coaxers. Taxes, bribes and 
transportation costs have the most important shares in the total mar-
keting costs of these informal actors. As a consequence, they also seem 
to earn the least among the market intermediaries. Clearly, with data 
from the field, they even appear to have a negative NMM. This result, 
being contrary to economic rationality, is paradoxical in explaining the 
existence and longevity (since the liberalization in 1991 until now) of 
informal actors in the marketing chain. In reality, informal actors adopt 
strategies to create substantial gains. These strategies, at the end, even 
lead them to obtain, on average, higher NMMs than the formal market 
intermediaries. For example, Ruf (2001) pointed out that buyers 
cheating in the South-West region can reach up to 20 or 30% of the 
weight of cocoa and thus the price paid/kg. 
Literature states that the marketing channel in which informality is 
observed is the most widespread in Cameroon (Bagal et al., 2013; 
Kamdem 2016), even though this study did not provide empirical evi-
dence on cocoa quantities within the different market channels iden-
tified to support this assertion. The magnitude of informality within the 
marketing chain endangers the quality of cocoa beans in particular and 
the sustainability of the sector in general. For example, the lower prices 
paid by coaxers on the spot may discourage smallholder farmers and 
lead, in the long run, to a decrease in the quantity and quality of cocoa 
produced. Besides, buying wet cocoa from farmers could lead to a high 
level of moisture content in cocoa to be exported. Bagal et al.(2013) 
supported this assertion by pointing out that the moisture content in 
cocoa from Cameroon is generally excessive. In Cameroon, the HC level 
reaches up to 10% but in Côte d’Ivoire, thanks to the better organiza-
tion of the marketing chain, the moisture content is only around 5%. 
The importance of fermentation to cocoa quality has been well estab-
lished (Ardhana and Fleet 2003). While in Ghana, fermentation is 
preferably done in trays, cages or on leaves for 6–7 days with a single 
turning of the beans during the second or third days (Baker et al. 1994); 
in the South West region of Cameroon, 52% of farmers do not ferment 
their beans. Fermentation was considered as simply an easy way to 
remove the pulp to facilitate drying. But when fermentation is con-
ducted, the beans are fermented in bags for 4–6 days and are not 
turned; indeed, these farmers focus more on beans weight and less on 
cocoa beans quality including during the drying treatment (Levai et al. 
2015). As a result, in 2013, for example, 2000 tons of cocoa from 
Cameroon were rejected from European ports because of high content 
of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons. During the 2012 and 2013 
campaigns, deliveries suffered from penalties in the range of £40 to 
£80/ton due to their non-compliant quality. The quality premium 
“Good Fermented” has disappeared in favour of bulk cocoa (NCCB, 
2014). By doing so, the name and reputation of cocoa from Cameroon 
are being degraded. Nevertheless, cocoa farmers in Cameroon are not 
fundamentally sensitized to produce quality cocoa which means at least 
improvement of postharvest treatments (fermentation and drying). The 
latter implies investments in equipment such as effective fermentation 
boxes, solar dryers or other technologies, and because most of the co-
operatives are weak and not able to provide such services, this would 
result in individual investments. Some farmers even sell their cocoa 
beans to other farmers with drying systems (Tardzenyuy et al., 2020). 
Additionally, cocoa farmers produce in small quantity (84% of farmers 
produce on less than 3 ha (Lescuyer et al., 2019)) and up to date there is 
no significant price differentiation for quality cocoa to encourage cocoa 
farmers to invest in post-harvest-technologies and exclusively sell in 
formal market chains. Knowing this context, coaxer services remain a 
significant alternative for smallholder cocoa farmers. 
To another extent, however, informality in the sector contributes to 
a certain degree to the overall longevity of production and thus, to its 
sustainability. Coaxers are the most important market intermediaries 
dealing directly with the smallholder producers, providing them with 
useful services for their cocoa activities as well as for their social life. 
Coaxers cover long distances, particularly in areas that are difficult to 
access, to collect cocoa from the smallholder farmers and deliver it to 
the LBAs (Lenou, 2017). In fact, it is doubtful that other, formal actors 
could perform these services, especially the evacuation of cocoa from 
areas that are difficult to access, at similarly low costs as the coaxers 
currently do. To support the argument that coaxers contribute to the 
sustainability of the cocoa sector through providing market proximity 
opportunities and reducing uncertainties for farmers, as an example, 
one cocoa farmer stated: « Je préfère vendre mon cacao même chez le 
coxeur, même s'il me trompe car c'est l'argent que je cherche et lui il peut de 
temps en temps me faire des prêts. J’aimerais bien sécher le cacao mais je 
suis pour la vente à domicile pour plus de sécurité »5 (cocoa farmer, Centre 
Region). Bagal et al. (2013) pointed out that since cocoa farmers are 
scattered, unorganized, and do not trust their cooperatives, they prefer 
to sell their cocoa individually and most often to coaxers to benefit from 
the multiple services provided (input provision, loans, fast cash selling, 
transportation, final drying). Informal transactions are also present 
between coaxers and LBAs. In such transactions, LBAs get involved in 
informal labour agreements with coaxers in order to reduce their costs 
significantly and increase their profits to the detriment of the latter 
which supports the idea that the coaxers in the Cameroonian cocoa 
sector support the structuralist point of view on informal sectors. 
6. Conclusions and recommendations 
The main effect of liberalization of the cocoa sector was an increase 
of the uncertainty in rural areas about price security and so, the sale of 
cocoa was no longer assured (Alary, 1996). Most importantly, it al-
lowed a number of private actors to emerge in the marketing chain, 
notably informal actors (Bagal et al., 2013; Kamdem, 2016; NCCB, 
2014). Since the liberalization, the importance of the informal market 
intermediaries in the marketing chain seems to be widely acknowl-
edged, although criticized. Thus, in this paper, the analysis of the cocoa 
marketing chain was carried out through the measuring and comparing 
of marketing margins of the formal and informal market intermediaries. 
The results indicated that informal actors are present in the most 
5 I prefer to sell my cocoa to the coaxers, even if he cheats me because it is the 
money I am looking for and he can from time to time give me loans. I would like to 
dry the cocoa but I am in favour of selling it from home for security reasons 
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widespread marketing channel and are the intermediaries nearest to the 
smallholder farmers who are spread over large areas that are difficult to 
access. This situation explains why theinformal actors incur the highest 
marketing costs in comparison to formal marketing actors and why the 
marketing costs in the Centre region are almost the double of those in 
the South-West. As a result, irrespective of the region, informal actors 
opt for illicit practices to avoid losses. 
The role and the functions of the informal actors within the mar-
keting chain, already widely recognized, could even increase in im-
portance, given the fact that public authorities are largely absent from 
the sector and that farmers benefit few services from formal actors or 
formal service providers. Indeed, in that sense, exporters may struggle 
more and more to obtain a satisfactory quality of cocoa since estab-
lishing traceability will be difficult with the enlargement of formal and 
informal linkages of this type (Gilbert, 2009). However, as an export 
commodity, the marketing of cocoa from Cameroon must meet the 
sanitary and phytosanitary requirements of the major export markets, 
notably markets of the countries in the European Union. Since the 
quality of the final product is related to the quality of cocoa beans, 
practices such as improper fermentation and drying as well as imperfect 
moisture management throughout the marketing chain need to be im-
proved if a long-term sustainability is envisaged. 
Informality in the cocoa marketing chain is a fact, and it will not 
disappear overnight simply by forbidance. Further, it is questionable 
whether its disappearance would contribute to the better performances 
of the cocoa marketing chain. However, if informality should diasppear, 
a number of interventions may be considered . For example, co-
operatives need to improve their performance in better managing their 
internal organisation as well as in providing the necessary services that 
are currently predominantly provided by coaxers. Cooperatives could 
integrate the competencies of coaxers by incorporating them as col-
lecting agents with a substantial salary per month. By doing so, the 
farmers will be less exposed to the risk of being cheated by coaxers 
while at the same time the quality control would be done at the co-
operatives. Apart from this more immediate formalisation of coaxers, 
more global interventions can be designed based on our findings. They 
all need to be directed toward finding new was of providing the services 
that are currently provided by the coaxers. These include services to the 
cocoa producers, the formal intermediaries and the exporters, and the 
new service delivery needs to be superior to the current one, otherwise 
they will not be selected. The Government would need to assist co-
operatives to boost their performance. The hitherto assistance for ex-
ample in strengthening their technical capacities is in view of our re-
sults entirely inadequate. It clearly lacks the realistic consideration of 
the role and performance of the coaxers. It lacks a realistic appraisement 
of the current significant defects in the cocoa sector (for example the 
all-pervading mistrust in the entire sector). Instead of demanding the 
Government should improve the road conditions, what is needed is a 
comprehensive understanding of the services and on the performance of 
the services delivery which would provide the necessary basis for de-
signing measures that actually work. 
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